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PUBLIC V. PRIVATE: THE STATUS OF LAKES
JAAs MU1No*
F AN inquiring reporter were to question well-informed, but not legally
trained, members of the public as to where the public stands with respect
to the use of lakes (other than the Great Lakes) by the public, he might ask:
1. Would the rights of the public be at all affected by whether the lake
happened to be circular, rectangular, or perhaps elliptical?
2. Would it be relevant, in deciding whether such rights exist in 1961,
to inquire whether in the year 1858, the Ojibways had made use of a particular
small lake in northwestern Minnesota for transportation of themselves or their
goods?
3. Finally, should the public rights to enjoy waters of a stream or lake
be granted or denied according to the availability of proof to indicate the use
(or usefulness) of the particular body for the flotation of saw-logs in the
1860's and 1870's?
Very likely the well-informed layman might well be more baffled at the
fact of the questions asked than he would be with the precise answers. He
would reason, it is suspected, that the reference to long-past customs presup-
posed a present adherence, in some manner, to such customs. He would be
right. The shape of the lake did indeed have an important bearing on the
riparian's rights to use all its waters.1 Minnesota did predicate present-day
navigability, i.e. availability of the lake for public fishing, boating and so on,
on its usefulness for transportation by Indian tribes in 18582 Wisconsin, with
some tendency to question it, has nevertheless reiterated its adherence to the
"saw-log" test.3
Herein it is proposed to deal with lakes, natural and artificial, other than
the Great Lakes, with respect to their use by members of the public for recrea-
tion. It is proposed to show something of the background in English and
American law, both with respect to use of the waters and use of the underlying
bed. In so doing, it will be necessary to assay the nature of that almost mystic
concept, "navigability," historically as well as currently.
Why do this? It is commonplace these days to read figures of population
projection. Along with this great increase, surely taking place, go other
phenomena. For example, the revolution in transportation has been paralleled
by a revolution in leisure time. It has been estimated, for example, that
leisure-time activities, loosely grouped under "recreation," are now responsible
for an annual outlay of $40 billion, eight percent of the gross national product.4
* Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University.
1. Lembeck v. Nye, 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.E. 686 (1890).
2. State v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 63 N.W.2d 278 (1954).
3. Olson v. Merrill, 42 Wis. 203 (1877); Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86,
76 N.W. 273 (1898).
4. Figures in this paragraph were cited by Seth Gordon, member of the Sugeon
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It is certainly not to be doubted that the greater part of outdoor recreation is
water-oriented. In 1959, 32 million Americans purchased hunting and fishing
licenses. That year these people spent an estimated $3.5 billion. By 1981,
60 million persons will have licenses, and they will be spending $6.3 billion.
The boating industry has grown in striking fashion. In 1947, there were
4,440,000 pleasure boats being used on rivers and lakes and coastal areas. Ten
years later there were over 7 million, with an annual increase of over one million
boats. Skin-diving, an exclusively post-war industry, is now in the $100 million
class.
In looking at navigability in the United States, three more or less ill-
defined historical eras should be considered:
1. The Colonial and immediate post-Colonial period in which little west-
ward movement had taken place.
2. The nineteenth century, starting with the great push given by develop-
ment of the Erie Canal, the railroads, river traffic, free land, virgin forests-the
era of the frontier.
3. The modern era, starting perhaps in the late part of the last century,
an era in which increasing use was being made of watercourses and lakes for
purposes other than commerce.
In the first period, the colonies and new states adopted, generally speaking,
the English view. The Crown owned the beds of tide waters, including rivers
to the extent affected by tides. With this ownership went the right to fish and
navigate. This ownership was in a representative, not a proprietary sense, and
thus could not be conveyed or leased out. Above salt water, rivers capable of
navigation by boats were legally "navigable," but a distinction must be made:
the public right to navigate in tidal waters was based squarely on the Crown's
ownership of the underlying bed; the public right to navigate on fresh-water
streams capable of sustaining such traffic depended on a navigation easement.
Those waters flowed over private lands, owned by the riparian proprietors on
each side. For this reason, the public never had fishing rights in such streams.
Their rights were strictly limited to navigation, i.e. use by boats for purposes
of commerce.5
In considering the second period two matters must be emphasized:
1. The Federal government early (in 1824) staked out its claim to regu-
late, under the Commerce Clause, not only commerce between the states, but
navigation and, hence, navigable waters whether in or out of a state6
2. In the process of creating new states from territories, the ownership,
by Federal Government, of the beds of navigable rivers and lakes, was trans-
ferred to the states in their sovereign capacity. Nonnavigable rivers, on the
General's Water Pollution Control Advisory Board, in an article, "Impacts of Pollution
on Outdoor America," Outdoor America (Feb. 1961).
5. 1 Farnham, Waters and Water Rights, 176-79, 237-40 (1904).
6. Gibbons v. Odgen, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1 (1824).
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contrary, covered land in which title was retained by the United States. As
land was patented, the fee to beds under nonnavigable waters was conveyed
to the patentee.7
What necessary connection, if any, lay between title and navigability? The
American courts, loosely applying English precedent, took the position that
only tidewaters were "navigable." This was true, so they may have reasoned,
because public use was dependent upon public ownership of the bed. Thus, the
initial tendency was to regard non-tidal waters, all of them, as not navigable,
and therefore not available to the public except as required by the overriding
provisions of the Commerce Clause.
If in some way "navigability" had been dependent upon title to the bed,
then would the matter of title to the beds of watercourses considered navigable
by the United States within the Commerce Clause be binding on the newly-
created states? The basic principles are simple enough. Laurent put it thus:
Upon the admission of a state to the Union, the title of the United
States to lands underlying navigable waters within the boundaries of
the state passes to it, as incident to the transfer to the state of local
sovereignty, and is subject only to the paramount power of the United
States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate
and foreign commerce. But if the waters are not navigable, the title
of the United States to lands underlying them remains unaffected by
the admission of the new state.8
These views have become well settled. 9 But perplexing questions involving title
were posed: e.g., would it be any violation of constitutional principles for the
states, eager, perhaps, to promote the welfare of their citizens through use of
waters for commercial and non-commercial purposes alike, to broaden the con-
cept of "navigability" regardless of bed title? The reasoning might proceed
along these lines: navigability, in the federal sense, must be determined only
to define the ambit of federal legislative jurisdiction with respect to the regula-
tion of commerce. True, title to the underlying beds will be in state ownership
or private ownership depending on a finding of navigability in the federal sense.
But does that result necessarily inhibit the state from claiming any waters
deemed suitable for purposes other than commerce to be "public" and, subject
to rights of access, available for public enjoyment?
Encouragement was given to this line of reasoning by several Federal cases,
notably Hardin v. Jordan'° and Barney v. Keokuk.loa Government surveyors, in
Hardin, had shown the lake as navigable, but in the lower court, the lake had
been found to be non-navigable. As to ownership of the bed, the Supreme Court
stated:
7. See Laurent, Judicial Criteria of Navigability in Federal Cases, 1953 Wis. L.
Rev. 8, 19.
8. Ibid.
9. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64
(1931) ; United States v. Holt States Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
10. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
lOa. 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
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In our judgment the grants of the government for lands bounded oil
streams and other waters, without any reservation or restriction of
terms, are to be construed as to their effect according to the law of the
state in which the lands lie."
In Barney, the Court referred to The Genesee Chief'2 as having declared that,
for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, "the Great Lakes and other navigable
waters of the country, above as well as below the flow of the tide, are, in the
strictest sense, entitled to the denomination of navigable waters."' 3 Hardin and
Barney proved but slender reeds. The United States, it became clear, was not
barred from disposing of lands below high water mark of navigable streams
before admission of the territory as a state.14 Similarly, it was a federal question,
to be decided by the application of federal rules, whether the Arkansas River in
Oklahoma was navigable. It was held to be non-navigable and hence an oil
and gas lease executed by the state was subject to cancellation.'5 Any doubts as
to the pervasiveness of the federal rules have long since been completely dissi-
pated."' Meanwhile, there had been some strange developments in Minnesota.
NAVIGABILITY IN MINNESOTA
Minnesota, "land of 10,000 lakes," home of the Dakotas, the Chippewas,
scene of an era of lumbering, was admitted to the Union in 1858. It is not
astonishing that such a state became the focal point of the developing federal
and state concepts of navigability as well as squabbles over strictly riparian
rights and the conflicting interest of the state and private owners in minerals
beneath lake beds. Some of these issues were generated in Wisconsin and in
Michigan, both generously pock-marked with bodies of water varying in charm
and ranging from the prairie pot-hole to rather extensive natural impound-
ments.
7
When the federal government patented lands bordering on a lake or river,
bounding said lands according to meander lines established by federal surveyors,
the United States thereby exhausted its interest in the lands and could not
thereafter claim any part of a lake bed relicted by natural causes.' 8 If the lake
were navigable, then without question the bed remained property of the state.
If non-navigable, the riparian owner's title depended on the laws of the state.
Hence plaintiff successfully asserted his right to the dried lake bed. Beyond
this, Lamprey contained a sweeping declaration, remarkable in that day, as to
the meaning of navigability in that state:
Many, if not the most, of the meandered lakes in this state are not
adapted to, and probably will never be used to any great extent for,
11. 140 U.S. 371, 384.
12. 12 How. (U.S.) 443 (1851).
13. 94 U.S. 324, 338.
14. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
15. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 77 (1922).
16. See cases cited supra note 9.
17. Actually, Minnesota is estimated to have some 16,000 lakes.
18. Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 192, 53 N.W. 1139, 1140 (1893).
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commercial navigation; but they are used-and as population in-
creases, and towns and cities are built up in their vicinity, will be still
more used-by the people for sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing,
skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural and even city pur-
poses, cutting ice, and other public purposes which cannot now be
enumerated or even anticipated.
If the term 'navigable' is not capable of a sufficiently extended mean-
ing to preserve and protect the rights of the people to all beneficial
public uses of these inland lakes, to which they are capable of being
put, we are not prepared to say that it would not be justifiable, within
the principles of the common law, to discard the old nomenclature,
and adopt the classification of public waters and private.' 9
This was all very well-at the time. No minion from Washington descended
on St. Paul, but questions remained: (1) how far could the state go in impos-
ing its own test on navigability? (2) are the public rights suggested in Lamprey
confined to easements for use, as in fishing and swimming? (3) may the state,
on its ipse dixit, assert title to the bed of lakes it considers "navigable?"
Minnesota had thus innocently embraced the invitation which the United
States Supreme Court had issued in Barney v. Keokuk, Hardin v. Jordan2"
and earlier decisions to claim for itself the prerogative of establishing a state
test for navigability. Other circumstances, as for example the discovery that
some of its lake beds contained valuable ore deposits, led to further difficulty-
this time involving conflicts with its own citizens. Finally, the problem arose
as to the rights of riparian owners compared to those of the general public.
This was the dilemma: could the state, consistently with the federal deci-
sions21 assert title to the beds of lakes on the basis of suitability of the over-
lying waters for recreational uses under the liberal Lamprey rule?22 Two cases
are here significant: (1) State v. Longyear Holding Co.,2 3 in which the state,
relying on the federal test, successfully asserted claim to an ore bed under
Syracuse Lake; (2) State v. Bollenback,24 a statutory proceeding to condemn
an easement for public access to Five Lake, a 228-acre body of water entirely
surrounded by private land. The court held Five Lake non-navigable under
the federal test (not used for navigation in 1858, year of Minnesota's admis-
sion), and hence the proceedings were invalid.
It may be seen that if the broad definition of the Lamprey case had been
followed, the result of Longyear would have been the same, but not that of
Bollenback, for obviously Five Lake was suitable for recreation in the form of
boating and other uses not connected with commerce. The court, not unmind-
ful of its implied modification of the Lamprey test, observed that the latter
might "still [have] importance in a situation where the state of Minnesota
19. Id. at 200, 53 N.W. 1143.
20. Supra notes 10 and 10a.
21. Supra note 9.
22. Supra note 19.
23. 224 Minn. 451, 29 N.W.2d 657 (1947).
24. 241 Minn. 103, 63 N.W.2d 278 (1954).
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conveys to a private party riparian land which was granted to it by the United
States after admission... and which borders a body of water non-navigable by
the federal test of navigation.125 Speaking of anomalies, this suggestion of the
court opens a strange vista of lakes equipped with two sets of riparian owners:
(1) a federal patentee playfully traversing every segment of the surface; and
(2) the hapless state grantees confined to the public waters, i.e. that part
overlying state-owned bed. 26
If the state asserts title for the purpose of securing an ore body, should it
be precluded from the benefits of a Lamprey-type test in determining navi-
gability and, consequently, title? In State v. Adams,27 six actions were involved,
brought for the purpose of determining adverse claims to lake beds in the
Rabbit Lake basin. The lakes were held non-navigable under the federal
test. The court made no mention of Lamprey, but went into a fairly detailed
historical evaluation of the relevant facts as to the use of the lake for com-
merce, in 1858, year of the state's admission. On petition for rehearing, the
attorney general, not unreasonably, urged that the court reconsider Bollenbach.
Mr. Justice Thomas Gallagher, speaking for the court, stated the issue as being
solely "the ownership of certain lake property as between the state and the
riparian owners thereof. 28 'Then, concluding a long review of case law, he
stated:
The briefs amici curiae (one of them a former Commissioner of Con-
servation) . . .deal mainly with the importance of the lakes and
streams to the people of the state from a recreational and tourist
standpoint. We are not unmindful of this, but we are not dealing with
the rights of the state to exercise control over its waters, nor is the
question whether the Bollenbach case was decided on the correct
theory before us. It was decided correctly upon the theory upon which
the attorney general then chose to submit it. The question of public
dedication was not submitted or determined herein. There will be
time enough to decide the extent to which the state may exercise
control over its waters which may be non-navigable under federal tests
when a case involving this issue is presented. 2 (Emphasis added.)
Did these remarks point the way to a solution of the perplexing matter of how
to reconcile the legitimate interests of the state in providing public recreation
for its citizens without infringing on the by now clear-cut federal decisions?
For those decisions had, especially in the Holt and Utah30 cases made two
matters clear:
1. As to states carved out of the public domain, title to land under-
lying waters under the federal test of navigability passed to the
25. Id. at 118, 63 N.W.2d 288.
26. Professor Bade had anticipated this result. Bade, Title, Points and Lines, 24 Minn.
L. Rev. 305, 324 (1940). If there were more than one federal grantee, there would, of
course, be possible conflicts among them.
27. 89 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1957).
28. Id. at 679.
29. Id. at 687.
30. Supra note 9.
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states by the several acts of admission. Since they did so pass, it
was entirely within the state's province to decide whether the lands
of a riparian extended to high water mark, low water mark or the
thread of the stream or center of the lake.
2. In such states, the title to lands underlying waters non-navigable
under the federal test did not and could not vest in the state. The
title remained in the United States or vested in the riparian.
Thus, the tantalizing suggestion of Justice Gallagher in State v. Adams
heralded a future declaration of state-what would be the proper word-
supremacy, primacy perhaps, as to waters clearly overlying non-state land, but
just as clearly useable for recreation in the many forms mentioned in Lamprey.
Here one might ask, if the land is not state land, is it private? The answer: it
is either private or federal, depending upon the effect which the federal courts
give to such patents.
The solution has not been achieved, but is seemingly within the grasp of
state authorities: first, reject the common law rule that would restrict riparian
owners of the use of their own "pie-shaped" sectors of the waters; second,
adopt either by judicial or legislative action, a policy declaring that all waters
of the state useful for recreation be considered as subject to a public easement
for such purposes. The first requirement has been met in the 1960 decision of
Johnson v. Seifert.81 Plaintiff, owner of about five percent of the shore line on
two small (each about 35 acres in area), unmeandered lakes,32 sought an injunc-
tion against the maintenance of a boundary fence cutting him off from the
main part of the lakes. The court found the lakes suitable for fishing, boating,
duck-hunting and other like uses. Plaintiff, seeking the widest possible dis-
cussion of the issues, made four contentions: (1) the lakes were navigable-
hence the beds were state-owned; (2) if non-navigable under the Federal test,
the state test should be applied; (3) regardless of ownership of bed, plaintiff,
as a riparian owner, had rights to use the entire surface of the lake, in common
with his fellow riparian owner; 33 (4) that he had acquired such rights by
prescription. It can be readily appreciated that plaintiff, by the second proposi-
tion, hoped for a sweeping clarification of the hint of Justice Gallagher only
two years before in State v. Adams.34 This hope was not realized, but in basing
the decision on the third contention, the court did the next best (and possibly
the only feasible) thing. It overruled a 1902 holding that in nonnavigable
lakes, one riparian could not shoot and retrieve ducks in waters fronting the
lands of another.35 The plaintiff, however, was shooting for bigger game:
Bollenbach.36 That decision should now be discarded, it was claimed, since
31. 100 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1960).
32. Meander lines are used by surveyors to follow the turnings of a shore line of
lake or stream. They do not constitute a finding by the Government surveyors that the
abutting water is or is not navigable. See Bade, op. cit. supra note 26.
33. Defendant owned all the remaining upland.
34. 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1958).
35. 86 Minn. 317, 90 N.W. 578 (1902).
36. Supra note 24.
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reliance had there been placed on the Lamprey v. Danz7 civil law doctrine of
use limited by bed ownership. But:
The citation of the Lamprey case in the Bollenbach case was solely for
the proposition that the right to hunt and fish is an incident of owner-
ship of the soil. The quotation from that case was particularly apt
because it also involved the question of rights in waters overlying
privately owned lakebed land, and thus was in point as authority for
the proposition that the waters, as well as the land, were privately
owned. But there was no question ... as to respective private hunting
and fishing rights of two or more shore owners in an intertract lake
since all the land surrounding and underlying the lake was owned by
one person.38 (Emphasis in original.)
The conclusion: that as to lakes navigable or nonnavigable, the riparian owners
have the right to enjoyment of all the waters useful for legitimate aquatic
activities. Further:
It is not to be overlooked that the Federal test of navigability is de-
signed for the narrow purpose of determining the ownership of lake-
beds, and for the additional purpose of identifying waters over which
the Federal government is the paramount authority in the regulation
of navigation. Whether waters are navigable has no material bearing
on riparian rights since rights do not arise from the ownership of the
lakebed but as an incident of the ownership of the shore.30
To sum up the Minnesota situation, certain matters seem settled:
1. Insofar as title is concerned, meaning title to lakebeds, no elastic
or liberal definition by state courts or legislatures can avail to the
prejudice of those who, under Federal tests, have become the
owners of the beds of nonnavigable lakes.
2. As to waters navigable under the Federal test, the state may
properly assert that title has remained in itself, since it is for the
state to determine whether the grants of upland bordering on a
lake, meandered or not, carry with them the state's title to the
beds.
3. Where navigable waters are concerned, the state's powers, both
regulatory as to the use of the waters, and proprietary, as to the
bed, are unlimited as to the latter and, as to the former, subject
only to the paramount power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.
40
4. The state, by its declaration, cannot make the waters of private,
nonnavigable lakes public, though there is perhaps a question as to
whether this disability is due to lack of access or outright lack of
power on the theory that property rights would then be taken.41
37. Supra note 35.
38. Supra note 31 at 693-94.
39. Id. at 694.
40. State v. Longyear Holding Co., 224 Minn. 451, 29 N.W.2d 657 (1947).
41. State v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 63 N.W.2d 278 (1954). This question was
not answered in Johnson v. Seifert, though the best guess would seem to be that in the
absence of any existing public rights on the lake-in the form of, say, land already owned
by the public fronting the lake-the state would not be in a position to condemn land
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5. If the state becomes a riparian owner, 42 the lake, whether navi-
gable or not under the Federal test, becomes available to the
public if suitable for public purposes.43
6. A riparian owner becomes entitled, if the lake fulfills the require-
ments of suitability for public use approved in Lamprey v. State
and Johnson v. Seifert, to the use of the entire lake.44
Perhaps it should be added that at one time the Minnesota courts held that
the state owned the bed of navigable streams and lakes, as well as the rights to
the use of the overlying waters in its sovereign capacity.4 5 After Korrer, how-
ever, the legislature declared, in effect, that the state owned the bed in its
proprietary capacity as well.46 Thus, Minnesota, as does New York, recog-
nizes a trust for the public in navigable waters. 46 a
A WORD AS TO WISCONsIN AND MIcHIGAN
Both states have adopted the "saw-log" test of navigability: a stream (and
apparently also a lake47) is navigable which, in its natural state, is capable of
floating saw-logs to mill or market.48 Apparently such capacity was not deter-
minable as of the date of admission (1848), because evidence in Olson v.
Merrill49 indicated no logs were run on Levis Creek before 1863. As to title to
lake and stream beds, for some reason rooted, perhaps, in history, Wisconsin
courts have said that title to lakebeds is vested in the state,5 0 while that of
stream and river beds is held by the riparian. 1 But with broad dicta in several
authoritative cases, the distinction has little practical meaning to the recrea-
tionist, at least insofar as he makes use of the waters and not the bed. In
addition Wisconsin relies heavily on the "trust" theory, stating in effect that
lake and stream beds, by whomsoever owned, are subject to the overriding
for an access easement even though, on completion, the state would own frontage which
would automatically give it riparian rights.
42. Strictly speaking, "littoral" refers to lake shores, "riparian" to shores of streams
and rivers. Courts, however, tend to employ the term "riparian" to either.
43. Supra note 2.
44. This is an aspect of the law of riparian rights and is not to be confused with
"public" rights. Thus the public might gain access through an interlake channel to lakes
whose shores were all privately owned. In such case, if the waters were "public," the use
would be sanctioned. The law of riparian rights, properly so-called, has to do with
correlative rights as between owners of the shore and includes, aside from recreational use,
consumptive usage such as for watering cattle, irrigation and public water supply. Such
matters, important as they are, lie beyond the scope of this article.
45. Bradshaw v. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., 52 Minn. 59, 53 N.W. 1066 (1892);
State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 148 N.W. 617 (1914).
46. See Bade, op. cit. supra note 26, at 322.
46a. A similar trust is recognized in New York: Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N.Y. 74
(1907) (Great South Bay-tidewater); Barnes v. Midland R.R. Terminal Co., 193 N.Y.
378, 85 N.E. 1093 (1908) (New York Bay); Knight v. Ciarlone, 200 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
47. Cf. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm., 201 Wis. 40, 46-47, 228
N.W. 144, 147 (1930).
48. Olson v. Merrill, 42 Wis. 203 (1877).
49. Ibid.
50. State v. Public Service Comm., 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957).
51. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).
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trust for the public use of the overlying waters for such activities as they
legitimately serve.52
Wisconsin has indicated some limitation on the doctrine that "navigable
waters are public waters." Though a small pond had become navigable under
the broad test by reason of the construction of a dam, the consequent raising
of the water level and use by the public for a number of years, this "dedication"
did not amount to the granting of a public right to harvest ice. 3 Thus, Waite
speculates, such winter sports as skating and ice-boating would be subordinated
to the littoral, lakebed owner's right to harvest ice.54 The court, in Haase,"
rejected the palpably untenable contention that by continued public use, the
title to the bed had vested in the state.
The significance of these cases, which are indeed only a sampling, is clear:
Wisconsin, with 2000 lakes of various sizes, shapes and depths, is intent on
preserving and perhaps extending the public rights, easements or "trust" in
its useable and accessible bodies of water. Parenthetically, it should perhaps be
mentioned that the broad sweep of Muench5" and its predecessors depended,
apparently, on a 1911 enactment (the Water Power Act) containing a section
declaring that "all rivers, streams, sloughs, bayous and marsh outlets, . . .
which are navigable in fact for any purpose whatsoever are hereby declared
navigable. 5 7 Though it pertained to the building of bridges and dams in such
waters, Muench and other cases declared that this statute had obviated recourse
to the saw-log test. But in 1960, the legislature deleted the phrase "for any
purpose whatever," so, presumably, Wisconsin is back to the saw-log test.5 8
Michigan, without benefit of any trust theory, reaches a similar position
by extending public rights to all inland waters capable of navigation (in-
cluding boating and fishing). 59 Bed ownership makes this difference: the
riparian, who owns the bed, has the right to attach traps for fur-bearing animals
to the sub-aqueous lands or the ice covering the lake.60 In Hall v. Wantz,1'
plaintiff sought an injunction against the maintenance of an anchored raft
some 600 to 1000 feet from plaintiff's shore and between it and the lake's
center. The raft was more or less permanently anchored in that area and
provided the physical trappings (fishing wells and the like) for, and was
operated as, a floating fish pier. This, said the court, was enjoinable as an
52. See Muench v. Public Service Comm., 261 Wis. 492, 511-12, 53 N.W. 514, 519-20(1952) for modem discussion. Also see Waite, Public Rights in Navigable Waters, 1958
Wis. L. Rev. 336 at 339-43 and passim.
53. Haase v. Kingston Cooperative Creamery Ass'n, 212 Wis. 585, 250 N.W. 444 (1893).
54. Waite, op. cit. supra note 52, at 349.
55. Supra note 53.
56. Supra note 52.
57. Wis. Stat. § 30.10(2).
58. Wis. Stat. § 30.10(2), as amended (Supp. 1960).
59. Hall v. Wantz, 336 Mich. 112, 57 N.W.2d 472 (1953) (inland lake connected by
a channel to Lake Michigan); Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659, 23 N.W.2d 117 (1946)
(lakes); Rice v. Ruddiman, 10 Mich. 125 (1862) (inland waters generally).
60. 212 Mich. 19, 179 N.W. 225 (1920).
61. Supra note 59.
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interference with property rights. The court, however, did not hold that
anchorage of any kind was forbidden, only that quasi-permanent anchorage
could not be considered as an exercise of the navigation easement
0 2
WHAT IS THE SHAPE oF THE LAIxE?
If it becomes pertinent to delimit accurately the metes and bounds of a
littoral owner's title to subaqueous land, it is at once apparent that considerable
difficulty could be encountered, especially in a rather large lake surrounded by
many small lots individually owned. That difficulty was avoided in Hall v.
Wantz only because a number of adjoining owners joined as plaintiffs, thus
making it clear that if the raft were shoreward of the lake's center, it was
floating over the land of at least one or more of the plaintiffs.63 In Lembeck v.
Nye,6 4 the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the so-called common law rule as
to ownership of nonnavigable inland lake. The defendant, owner of a small
portion of the frontage (plaintiff owned the rest) was enjoined from using the
lake for boat hire and fishing. The court noted that Chippewa Lake was not
circular and, without considering the problem of a rounded end, intimated that
in a long lake the stream test could be applied without difficulty-referring to
the rule that each riparian owns to the thread of the stream (filum aquae). 65
Otherwise, the court intimates, the center, rather than the thread, would be
decisive; hence the respective interests would take the appearance of a pie,
cut in pieces of various sizes.
Pie-cutting formulas would now seem obsolete in Ohio, however, where
the Supreme Court, in two recent pronouncements, has overruled its former
position as to the test of navigability. The Federal test (suitability as highways
for commerce) has been supplanted by one recognizing "availability for boating
or sailing for pleasure and recreation as well as for pecuniary profit." 66 The
Supreme Court of Ohio has relied, in the Coleman case, 66a on United States v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co.,0 7 sometimes called the New River case.
Referring to the latter, the court said:
[I]t was held that lack of commercial traffic is not a bar to a con-
clusion that the stream is navigable, where personal or private use by
boats demonstrates the availability of the stream for the simpler types
of commercial navigation; that the navigability of a stream is to be
62. 336 Mich. 112, 57 N.W.2d 472 (1953).
63. Ibid.
64. 47 Ohio St. 336, 24 N.E. 686 (1890).
65. Bade, op. cit. supra note 26, at 341-42, has stated the rules appertaining to
round lakes. Straight lines would be projected from the boundaries of the shore properties,
i.e. starting at the points where the lateral boundaries of the tracts intersect the meander
lines, and thence converging, in straight lines on the center of the lake. However un-
workable, these pie-cutting rules are still operative in those jurisdictions recognizing bed
ownership in either navigable or nonnavigable lakes except those owned by the state.
66. Coleman v. Schaefer, 163 Ohio St. 202, 126 N.E.2d 444 (1955); approved in
Mentor Harbor Club, Inc. v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 193, 163 N.E.2d 373
(1959).
66a. Coleman v. Schaefer, ibid.
67. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
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determined on the basis, not only of its natural condition, but also
of its possible availability for navigation after the making of reason-
able improvements.68
It will be recalled that in State v. Adams,89 decided in 1954, the Minnesota
court had before it the New River case; yet Adams went on the matter of
navigability under the traditional Federal commercial test. Actually, New
River was cited and quoted, but only with respect to what the United States
Supreme Court had said about waterways which, though not suitable as
highways for commerce in their ordinary state, could be improved and made
so.70 It may well be doubted, however, that New River was intended to
operate as a drastic change in the concept of navigability. 71
TRENDS TowARD COMMON USE
Johnson v. Seijert72 is symptomatic of a trend away from the common
law doctrines that would restrict use of lake waters on the basis of bed
ownership. The modern cases have either rejected the common law approach
outright in favor of common use, or have, as in Ohio, employed a broad
definition of "navigable," thus opening, by implication, previously "non-
navigable" lakes to common use regardless of bed ownership. Michigan is
said to be the first state adopting the so-called civil law rule permitting common
use.73 In recent years, the position has been explicity adopted in Florida,
74
Mississippi,75 Virginia,78 Washington, 77 Arkansas,77 a and Minnesota.7 8
On the other side of the ledger, Pennsylvania has recently affirmed its
continued adherence to an established common law policy.79 New York courts
of the trial and intermediate appeal levels appear to have approved the
common law rule, though there seems to be no square holding. For example,
Tripp v. Ritchter0 held that an owner of a small portion of the bed of a pond
did not have common rights with the owner of the greater part of the bed.
68. 163 Ohio St. 202, 205, 126 N.E.2d 444, 446 (1955).
69. 251 Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661.
7o. Ibid.
71. In the New River case, it was not necessary for the Court to extend basic concepts
of navigability for this reason: Congress has plenary power to regulate interstate commerce
and hence navigable waters. If, to carry out this power, it is necessary to regulate or
interfere with non-navigable watercourses, this may be done. The principle has been
repeated many times. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960);
Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508, 523 (1940); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 76, 90
(1931); United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 706 (1899).
72. Supra note 31.
73. Beach v. Hayner, 207 Mich. 93, 173 N.W. 487 (1919).
74. Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959); 9 Kans. L. Rev. 91 (1960).
75. State Game & Fish Comm. v. Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539, 193 So. 9 (1940).
76. Improved Realty Corp. v. Sowers, 195 Va. 317, 78 S.E.2d 588 (1953).
77. Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash.2d 815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956); Johnson, Riparian and
Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 Wash. L. Rev. 580 at 605 (1960).
77a. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
78. Johnson v. Seifert, supra note 31.
79. Lakeside Park v. Forsmark, 396 Pa. 389, 153 A.2d 486 (1959).
80. 158 App. Div. 136, 142 N.Y.S. 563 (3d Dep't, 1913).
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SOME PARTING THOUGHTS
It may be doubted that the transplanted Puritans who promulgated the
Great Ponds Ordinance of Bay Colony in 1641 were prompted solely (if indeed
at all) by the sporting aspects of "fishing and fowling." They had left
England only a few years before, to get away from monopolies and privileges
for the few. In this ordinance-the "Body of Liberties" as it was called-their
purpose was to once and for all abolish the forest laws, the game laws and
laws permitting exclusive -fisheries. Yet surely when they decreed that Great
(meaning ten acres or more) Ponds should be available for those purposes, it
seems likely that here was a way provided for a man to enrich his soul as
well as his larder. The ordinance even provided-as modem legislators might
well note-that members of the public not owning riparian land could never-
theless gain access over the lands of another if, in so doing, there was "no
trespass upon any man's corn or meadow."81
The westward movement, starting late in the eighteenth century, was not
energized by those seeking common rights. They heralded the days of rugged
individualism, accompanied by the devastation of forests by fire and axe. Land
had to be cleared and drained. Every man should prosper on his 160-acre
homestead-the desert would bloom. But it did not always work out that way.
Floods came, farms were washed away. There were drouths, grasshopper
infestations, blizzards such as that of '86 which wiped out countless small
homesteaders in the Dakotas and Montana.
Now we seem to be coming back to first principles. Instead of forest laws
to keep the forests for the privileged few, we have national parks and national
forests for all. Instead of game preserves, we have hunting by license open to
all on public ranges. Fishing has become a major industry, the most popular
pastime in America. And now everywhere the trend is towards preservation
and wise use of our great, though diminished heritage of forest and mountain,
lake and stream.
Has the law kept pace with these trends? Does it serve those who would
protect, as it once served those who would despoil these resources? Largely,
yes. The stumbling blocks to progress, due in part to federal decisions of the
last century and in part to conflicting economic pressures on the community,
have been overcome for the most part. Possibly one of the greatest unresolved
problems is that of access. How to legally provide for the public to get in to
waters which are "public," i.e. susceptible of use for recreation, without
trespass to private property? For example, Minnesota, fabled "land of 10,000
lakes," actually has, according to estimates, some 16,000 lakes of ten or more
acres. Designated access, however, is limited to 342 lakes and streams.8 2
Even so, sport fishermen, one million strong, resident and non-resident, spent
an estimated $1,000,000, in the state in 1957.
81. For text of the pertinent parts of the ordinances and background, see Slater v.
Gunn, 170 Mass. 509, 513, 49 N.E. 1017, 1019 (1898).
82. Cited in Brief for Amicus Curiae (Minnesota Division, Izaak Walton League of
America) in Johnson v. Seifert, supra note 31.
